Lebanon’s current leadership and its affiliated institutions have aligned with Israel on the issue of disarming Hezbollah. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are advancing this agenda with the support of parties such as the Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb Party, which have long awaited such an opportunity.
Despite Hezbollah’s strict adherence to the 2024 ceasefire agreement, foreign backers of the Lebanese state have expressed dissatisfaction with the pace and handling of disarmament. As Hezbollah maintained restraint, its adversaries escalated their rhetoric – first demanding disarmament, then calling for its complete dismantlement. The lack of tangible progress led figures like Fares Souaid to question the purpose of disarmament altogether, particularly given Hezbollah’s entrenched parliamentary presence.
Each instance of Hezbollah’s restraint was met with further escalation by its opponents, who leveraged official channels and state mechanisms under the current leadership.
This pressure soon expanded into a broader campaign targeting Hezbollah’s social and educational institutions. Financial and political actors, including banker Antoun Al-Sehnaoui and figures such as Salim Sfeir, spearheaded these efforts with strong media backing. In line with American demands, they targeted Al-Qard Al-Hassan despite its status as a non-bank institution. This move paved the way for increased financial control by figures such as Riad Salameh and his successor Karim Souaid, with the apparent aim of consolidating access to what remains of depositors’ funds.
Each instance of Hezbollah’s restraint was met with further escalation by its opponents, who leveraged official channels and state mechanisms under the current leadership. Aoun cited external pressure, while Salam framed disarmament as a national interest.
Over time, both policy and rhetoric took on a sectarian dimension. The Shia community increasingly felt targeted, as the approach appeared to treat entire communities as extensions of Hezbollah until proven otherwise. Parallel pressures also mounted against Shia populations in parts of the GCC.
For over a year, pro-US and pro-Israel factions in Lebanon interpreted events through an Israeli lens, at times treating statements by the Israeli army’s spokesperson as de facto guidance. Misjudgments by foreign envoys and officials from Washington, Riyadh, and European capitals further compounded the situation.
Washington later shifted toward a strategy of maximum pressure, demanding concrete steps from Lebanese officials. Focus turned to the Lebanese army, viewed as capable of forcibly disarming Hezbollah. American, Saudi, and European officials pressured the army chief, even calling for his removal after he firmly rejected the possibility of the army confronting civilians.
The US approach itself was not unified. Morgan Ortagus adopted a confrontational strategy with little result, while her successor, Tom Barrack, attempted to broker a settlement before withdrawing after failing to achieve progress. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri supported government measures in anticipation of reciprocal concessions that never materialized. Following Barrack’s withdrawal, the dossier was handed to Ambassador Michel Issa.
Beirut appears to have reverted to a pattern reminiscent of the era of Syrian influence, when external powers issued competing directives and local actors awaited instructions from abroad.
Issa struggled to secure broad cooperation, relying largely on a limited circle led by Fouad Makhzoumi. Meanwhile, in Washington, hardline Senator Lindsey Graham advocated for a tougher stance and opposed political compromise. US-aligned right-wing figures in Lebanon, including Antoun Al-Sehnaoui, echoed this position.
In this context, Beirut appears to have reverted to a pattern reminiscent of the era of Syrian influence, when external powers issued competing directives and local actors awaited instructions from abroad. Today, Washington’s allies seem similarly constrained, while Saudi engagement has diminished following repeated failures to persuade the new Syrian leadership to confront Hezbollah.
Above all, the leadership appears to be pursuing normalization with Israel, drawing comparisons to Mahmoud Abbas’s model in Ramallah.
The actions of Aoun and Salam’s government, as characterized here, amount to national treason. Measures have included restricting weapons in line with Israeli interests, prosecuting resistance fighters, and tasking security agencies with gathering intelligence on the resistance and its positions. The government has also maintained a hardline stance toward Iran, including calls to expel its ambassador and sever diplomatic ties.
Above all, the leadership appears to be pursuing normalization with Israel, drawing comparisons to Mahmoud Abbas’s model in Ramallah.
Nothing illustrates this more clearly than Nawaf Salam’s remarks on negotiations with Israel, which suggest approval, and even pride, in crossing that threshold.
For these reasons, the removal of the current government is a national imperative. Once again: bring down the government of shame.
